Introduction Introduction
On 14 January 2011, Jayeen-a front of Jordanian activist groupings (the name means 'we are on our way')-called for a day of anger. People of diverse backgrounds and ideological commitments responded to the call, coming out on to the streets to demand the ouster of Prime Minister Samir Rafa'i and his government. The regional context added to the headiness of the moment. Jordan's citizens seemed to be inscribing themselves into the wider upheaval-the global moment-that would soon be known as the Arab Spring.
Watching the news at the time, one might be forgiven for thinking that the call for protest had arrived in Jordan by way of Cairo or Tunis. But the coverage was misleading. Protest had become a regular feature of Jordan's political landscape over the preceding years. This protest was not oriented against the ubiquitous abstraction of the authoritarian regime. Nor was it oriented towards some abstract notion of liberal freedom as such. It was much more situated and-on the surface, at least-much more local than that. The demonstrators were responding to very real changes that had been brought about by more than a decade of rapid and dramatic neoliberal restructuring, changes that dramatically impacted not only upon livelihoods, but also on peoples' sense of place and community. The fact that they came together and took to the streets in January 2011 was not a spontaneous effect of social media, nor the mirroring of television coverage of distant events. It was the result of sustained efforts at organizing, and of connecting the dots between seemingly diverse and place-bound contexts of interest, identity and struggle.
It is always difficult to place, or to pin a date on, the start of a trend or movement. But 31 But, while this event was noteworthy for the violence it provoked, it was part of a trend that stretched back several years. As early as 2002, day laborers, factory workers, teachers, public sector employees and even retired army officers were visibly engaged in the formation of new and increasingly activist affiliations (see Adely, 2012) . These new movements were emerging in response to situations similar to those that had obtained in Aqaba. The problem was not so much the abuse of state power as such, but the consequences of its privatization. Government was being articulated (and political economy transformed) through an array of place making projects and agencies. These included, inter alia, special economic zones, megalomaniacal urban regeneration projects, new planning agencies and development authorities, public-private partnerships and community-based initiatives. These arrangements not only announced new practices and styles of governing; they fundamentally restructured relations between people, between people and the artifacts of their daily experience, and between people and the places they inhabited. In short, protest emerged from within a variegated array of place making projects, each of which advanced or responded to a market oriented logic of 'reform;" and each of which identified, essentialized and instrumentalized local difference in the production or management of neoliberal effects (Parker, 2014) . The challenge for protesters was thus to recognize and articulate a critique that transcended the particularism of individual protest actions in diverse locales. This critique did not descend pre-given from the global ether: it is a product of struggle, and it is still in the making in Jordan.
Starting from an account of how neoliberal place making projects in Amman dis-placed existing relations of government and power-both in the city and beyond-we draw on indepth interviews with activists, and a critical reading of Jordan's recent political economic past, to show how protesters have struggled to re-place those relations, articulating an alternative platform from which make their own political counter-claims intelligible and effective. Place, in our perspective, is not seen as something that is reducible to an endogenous essence: rather, places emerge by virtue of the distinctiveness of the particular connections that meet within and through them (see Massey, 2005) , 2 and by virtue of the dominant paradigms that make place legible and recognizable as such. It is also important to note that the current expressions of protest in Jordan also have a much deeper genealogy, reflecting identities and interests articulated over a longer history of engagement with the forces of capitalism, imperialism and state-making. Consistent with the point made immediately above, the seemingly local places that provide the immediate setting for protest in Jordan are themselves the product of earlier rounds of global engagement (Parker, 2009, 119) . Indeed, place does not simply indicate the arena of social struggle; it is a constituent stake in that struggle.
Nor has protest been located exclusively outside "the state" as traditionally understood: it has also-as we discuss in greater detail below-come from within the army and from the public sector. Neither protest, nor the power that it contests, can be mapped onto binary schemes of state-society or public-private: the powers of government and those of the governed are spread across overlapping assemblages of (inter alia) actors, artifacts, infrastructures, practices and meanings; the production of claims and effects within these assemblages provide a constitutive stake of political struggle (Parker, 2010) . While a full accounting of this genealogy is beyond the scope of the current chapter, it should be kept in mind while reading what follows.
Neoliberalism and the production of space: Articulating a landscape of power On 12 September 2006 , two Egyptian construction workers were killed and 16 others injured when 3 floors of the Jordan Gate's north tower collapsed during construction. 3 The event galvanized local residents who, backed by protests from within the Engineers Association, began to raise concerns about the project. Critics noted that the land had originally been expropriated under the pretense that it would be used for a public park. The case also demonstrated clear planning deficiencies: consideration had not been given to the extreme traffic congestion that would result; nor had the impact of the towers on local water and sewage infrastructures been taken into account. Finally, there was concern about the Greater Amman Municipality's (GAM) financial stake in the project: how, asked residents, could the GAM be both a financial stakeholder in the project and represent the concerns of citizens? Questions had been raised about the project from the outset, but were brushed aside-in part because the project had been endorsed by the King, who was eager to see progress on his vision of making Amman a destination city for investment, tourism and international agencies. In any case, the controversy led the king to dismiss Hadid, who was accused of incompetence, and of standing in the way of modernization. 4 He was replaced by Omar Ma'ani, a prominent businessman. Ma'ani represented the business-oriented and managerial approach to government called for by the new vision. The incident also lent urgency to calls for master planning in Amman. At the time of the Jordan Gate incident, nearly 350 plans for high-rise buildings had been submitted to the GAM. The market was overheating, and speculation-fueled by surplus petro-dollars from the Gulf, together with Amman's position as a logistical hub for operations in Iraq-was threatening to spiral out of control. representatives of Gulf investment agencies, and King Abdullah II himself. The significant profits generated by these arrangements were destined for reinvested in the army. As such, the army created the image of a self-sufficient modern army that no longer (fully) depends on the state budget. These investments/agencies would contribute to the military pension fund, and also be invested in job training centres, health care provision for veterans and their families, and social housing for servicemen and women.
The specific investment structure and distribution of profits amongst well-connected investors has been discussed elsewhere, and is beyond the scope of the current paper. 15 Suffice it to say that-consistent with the outcome of similar neoliberal urban megaprojects elsewhere-those who profited were those who already had the wealth and connections that enabled them to do so. To be sure, critics (and the general public) argued that the sale of public land at below market prices was intrinsically corrupt. The huge profits stood in stark contrast to the public costs of government. GAM ultimately paid for the infrastructure and the road development around the project which amounted to 34 million JD. 16 There was also a glaring disparity between investor profits and the enormous debts incurred by MAWARED.
But the project was based on publically traded shares, and transactions were by and large carried within the boundaries of accepted best practice.
We return to the discussion of corruption below. But the main points for the argument here are: 1) the ways in which these projects impacted directly on people's lived experience of the city and its possibilities; and, most importantly, 2) the ways in which these urban In order to elaborate the second point, we now turn to a more detailed discussion of how the Army's involvement in these projects provoked the emergence of a crucial actor within Jordan's protest landscape: the movement of the Army Veterans Association, and the small town and rural constituencies that it in practice represents. We also show how neoliberal practices of government, and the urban projects associated with it, also gave rise to 2009
protests by port workers in Aqaba.
The rebirth of politics: Articulating the landscape of protest While protesters from various neighborhoods in Amman were gathering at the duwwar, another group-some 20.000 strong-was gathering on the other side of Amman, in King Hussein Park. These protesters were not from Amman, but mostly from towns and villages north of the capital. They had come for a to defend the Palace. These protesters felt that the palace had already fallen under the sway of a liberal, "Palestinan" elite-an elite who had benefitted from privatization and the politics of economic reform more generally. They worried that the demands of these urban protesters might push the balance further towards urban business interests at their expense. About mid-day, they began to move en mass from King Hussein Park, eventually advancing on the duwwar. There were major altercations, and the Darak (the elite troops-gendarmerie), appeared to intervene on the side of those who had marched from the park. One man died, and a hundred were wounded.
The day after, the protesters reorganized to express their anger about the violence used by the Darak. By zooming in on placemaking projects in Amman and Aqaba, we set out to reveal configurations of capital and power hidden within a landscape of government that has become increasingly (or at least differently) variegated over the past twenty-five years. We also situated groups within the uneven geography of development that can be mapped over and through that landscape. The point was to call attention to the material contexts of meaning and practice within which protest has been situated. Struggles start from particular places, and not in abstract-extended space. Place therefore matters for social struggles.
Above, we traced the agencies and practices implicated in the production of neoliberal urban space/place, and showed how these projects impacted upon the lives of both rural and citydwelling Jordanians. Yet, in spite of this underlying connection, protestors from different parts of the country percieved themselves as having very different stakes in whatever change might coming, and these were expressed in identities that presented themselves not only as essential (urban-Palestinian v rural/tribal-Transjordanian), but also seemingly irreconcilable. In the remainder of the paper, we look at the roads traveled by the protesters as they began to challenge these essentialisms and make the connections, developing a critique-and articulating a framework of action-that could build upon and potentially transcend the 'militant particularisms' (Williams, 1989; Harvey, 1996) on display in the early days of the Jordanian hirak. 48 It would be easy (indeed, too easy) to look at events in Jordan and suggest that the tranformative potential of the protests had been undermined by such "militant particularism:" the particular and place-bound character of claims put forward in the context of the Jordanian Spring seem-at first sight-difficult to reconcile. They provide those in power with a resource that can be manipulated for purposes of divide and rule. Indeed, this particularism and it's manipulation have been put forward to explain the relative failure of Jordan's protest movement to effect radical change (and, vis-versa, the apparent stability of "the regime" has been seen as evidence of a fragmented and manipulated population).
However, this is a relatively superficial reading, one that evaluates the protests 'from above'-from the perspective of a particular notion of the regime-rather than from the lived contexts of the governed. Just as the urban megaprojects in Amman and Aqaba rearticulated not only urban relations, but also relations between government and the governed in rural many rural areas (as described above), so efforts have been made to connect to hirak groups in secondary cities and towns across the Kingdom (e.g., Kerak,
Ma'an and Tafileh). To be sure, such efforts have faced significant obstacles. But protest has given rise to a critique of current (neoliberal) government practice that transcends boundaries of place, and that cuts across ideology. Although this entanglement of movements is precarious, it illustrates that supposedly essential and insurmountable ruptures based on identity are foremost political, and not natural givens. 55 58 Because the costs of electricity and transportation are reliant on petroleum derivatives, the increase automatically caused price increases in almost all commodities. This provided enough impetus for protesters from various opposition factions to take to the streets.
In the early months of the protests, charges of corruption were directed primarily towards This and other slogans popped up in larger demonstrations, over the ensuing months.
Protesters were now openly criticizing the Monarchy and its links to investors. On 13
November 2012, more than 2,000 protesters were back at the duwwar ad-dakhaliyya chanted "Revolution, revolution, it is a popular revolution" and "Freedom is from God, in spite of you, Abdullah" during an impromptu demonstration sparked by the governments decision to raise fuel prices. 64 Other slogans that were used in that period were "Either fix it now, or follow Abidine [Ben Ali]", "This Jordan is our Jordan, and the traitor should get away from us", "Freedom, freedom, not royal handouts", "Freedom from God, against your will oh Abdullah", "The people want the fall of the regime" and "Down, down with the rule of the scoundrel]".
65
As the protests spread over the whole of Jordan, 66 Queen Rania came under fire. A range of high profile tribal figures questioned the role the Queen was playing in Jordan's political and economic power structure, pointing specifically to the lavish spending on her birthday party in Wadi Rum. Everything related to her person became a target of critique.
Gradually, she was coming to be seen as the personification of everything wrong with neoliberal reform. She was ordered to lay low for a while. 
Conclusion
While protest in Jordan has not been revolutionary, the Hashemite Kingdom has undoubtably witnessed a rebirth of the political. In order to understand this rebirth-and to recognize the stakes that are involved in protesters efforts to reassemble the political-the Jordanian protest movement must be situated in a landscape of government and uneven development that has emerged over 25 years of neoliberal reform.
Jordan does not present us with a clear-cut case of protestors confronting a regime. It is not about state power v people power. Rather, it offers a story about how people struggle (some, by necessity, more than others) to craft and reassemble the relations of place and meaning from which both these modalities of power (and others) emerge, and within which they are deployed. Neoliberalism provides a framework of legibility within which claims about power and meaning might be asserted. It is therefore not simply about the introduction of new practices, but about reinventing the old, inscribing them into new frameworks of calculation, and imbuing them with new meaning (just think about how notions like resilience, empowerment and community have become buzzwords that naturalize neoliberal agencies and effects). One needs to examine not only neoliberal claims and assumptions, but also actual modalities of neoliberal practice, and the ways in which that practice relates to, and draws power from, practices that do not appear at first glance to have anything at all to do with neoliberalism. And one must start not from abstract claims, but from an awareness of how these practices have impacted upon people's lived experience, and of the ways in which that experience informs perceptions of political and socio-economic possibility.
In a world where power is diffused through an astonishingly variegated array of sites and agencies, where the local sources of power are difficult to distinguish from the distant, and where the question of "who is really governing" has no clear answer, transformation cannot merely be a matter of attacking a regime or laying claim to a state apparatus (Parker, 2010) .
The neoliberal situation thus problematizes efforts at transformational protest. At the same time, however, this might present protestors with a political situation that is as open as it has ever been. People protest not to express a critique, but to find one. It is in the course of protest that the whereabouts of power are revealed and (potentially) held to account. As such, the task of protest is not simply to occupy space, but rearticulate it; and it is not only to
